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Introduction 
 
 
Lebanon’s Slow-Motion Self-Destruction 
State Institutions Disintegrate under Pressure of the Conflict in Syria 
Heiko Wimmen 
The conflict in Syria has already led to flare-ups of violence in Lebanon, but the worst 
may still be to come. As the Shiite Hizbullah fights alongside Syrian government troops, 
and Lebanese Sunni Islamists join the ranks of the rebels, sectarian tension is surging 
in Lebanon itself. At this point in time, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) provide the 
last buffer against all-out sectarian war. Yet their capacity to keep a fragile peace is 
now threatened by an accelerated erosion of Lebanon’s political institutions. Germany 
and the EU should provide equipment, training and financial support for the LAF, and 
impress upon pro-Western Lebanese parties the need for a minimum consensus that 
retains the legitimacy of the armed forces to act on behalf of the Lebanese state. 
 
As the Lebanese are drawn ever further into 
the conflict in Syria, violence is flaring up 
in Lebanon itself. Already since the summer 
of 2011, fighting has erupted on a regular 
basis in the northern port city of Tripoli 
between the local pro-Assad Alawi commu-
nity and Sunni neighborhoods rooting for 
the rebels. Since early 2013, a string of skir-
mishes involving the LAF and local actors 
supporting either Hizbullah or the Syrian 
rebellion have created high tension in the 
northeast of the Bekaa Valley, just across 
the border from the embattled Syrian 
towns of Qusair and Homs. Lebanese Sunni 
preachers with Salafi backgrounds call for 
Jihad in Syria and attack Hizbullah for its 
support of the Syrian regime. In late June 
2013, the LAF battled one such firebrand 
Salafi agitator in the mixed southern city 
of Sidon, leaving some 20 soldiers dead. 
Residential areas in Beirut that are iden-
tified with Hizbullah have become targets 
for missile and bomb attacks of unknown 
provenance, with the apparent objective 
of spreading fear among the support base 
rather than attacking the party itself. Sup-
porters of Hizbullah accuse Sunni politi-
cians of fanning the flames of sectarianism; 
the latter routinely distance themselves 
from the radicals but insist that Hizbullah’s 
military structures are the true root of the 
security problem. Mutual distrust runs high 
between Sunni and Shiite Lebanese, fueling 
a pervasive fear of all-out sectarian conflict. 
Struggling for neutrality 
The effects of the conflict in Syria on the 
Lebanese political system appear less dra-
matic as of now but are liable to be just 
 SWP Comments 21 
August 2013 
2 
as dangerous in the mid- to long run. Offi-
cially, all political forces in Lebanon are 
committed to a policy of neutrality, or 
“disassociation” from the Syrian conflict, 
in order to avoid a serious confrontation 
between the two opposed camps that have 
dominated Lebanese politics since 2005. 
The March 14 block – and in particular 
its core support in the Sunni community – 
fall in line with their co-sectarians in Syria, 
who form the backbone of the rebellion, 
as well as with the policies of Saudi Arabia, 
which is the regional patron of both. The 
Shiite parties Hizbullah and Amal, as the 
mainstays of the March 8 block (both dates 
relate to rival demonstrations in 2005 for 
and against the Syrian presence in Leba-
non), follow the line of their regional 
patron, Iran, and the perceived necessity to 
maintain Syria in the camp of “resistance” 
against Israel and the United States. Leba-
nese Christians, in turn, either come down 
on the side of liberalism and democracy, 
ostensibly represented by March 14 and the 
Syrian rebellion, or fear the rising influence 
of radical Sunni Islamists among these ac-
tors, and therefore lean towards justifying 
the position of the Syrian regime. Finally, 
the Lebanese Druze oscillate between both 
blocks, torn between liberal leanings on the 
one hand and fear for the Druze communi-
ty in Syria in the event of an Islamist take-
over on the other. 
Underneath the surface of official neu-
trality, accusations that both camps were 
secretly involved in Syria continued to sur-
face in the local media. In December 2012, 
an MP for March 14 was named as a major 
organizer of weapon transfers to the rebel-
lion. Recruitment of volunteers and the 
transfer of fighters and provisions continue 
apace in (Sunni) areas supportive of March 
14, allegedly with support of politicians 
from this camp. On the other side, news 
about funerals for Hizbullah fighters for 
months fueled suspicions that the party 
was participating in the fighting. Finally, 
in May 2013 the party officially announced 
that it had joined the crucial battle of 
Qusair and would stand with the Syrian 
regime as part of the “resistance” against 
the United States and Israel. 
Thus, the government of Lebanese Prime 
Minister Najib Miqati was increasingly 
undercut on an existential policy issue, 
even by factions ostensibly supporting his 
government. This added further weight to 
long-standing accusations that he was but a 
fig leaf for Hizbullah’s domination of the 
political system, handing the (Shiite) party 
effective control over the post of the prime 
minister, a traditional Sunni domain. In 
March 2013, Miqati chose to resign. 
Erosion of institutional legitimacy 
Despite initial support from a broad bi-
partisan majority in parliament, the des-
ignated new prime minister, Tammam 
Salam, a respected, non-aligned political 
figure from Beirut, has so far not succeeded 
to form a new government. Political grid-
lock now threatens to bring Lebanon’s 
institutions to a grinding halt. 
By the end of May, last-ditch efforts to 
end months of bitter wrangling over a new 
electoral law for the parliamentary elec-
tions due in June finally collapsed. Since 
designing electoral laws in Lebanon inevi-
tably implies acts of gerrymandering that 
affect the balance of power, compromise is 
notoriously difficult. Faced with the immi-
nent threat of a power vacuum, as the dead-
line for elections was about to elapse, the 
Lebanese Parliament postponed the vote 
and extended its own term by 17 months. 
Although supported by a large majority 
of MPs, the decision itself was highly con-
troversial and now threatens to draw one 
institution after the other into a quickly 
expanding vortex of eroding legitimacy. 
Challenges to the decision’s constitution-
ality could not be heard by the constitu-
tional council, as several judges bowed 
to political pressure and boycotted the 
sessions, thus preventing a quorum. The 
question whether the extension was 
actually legal was hence not answered but 
suppressed, and three attempts to convene 
the extended parliament have since failed 
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for lack of a quorum. Sectarian sensitivities 
– namely, that a working parliament along-
side a suspended government will empower 
the Shiite position of the speaker of parlia-
ment at the expense of the Sunni position 
of the prime minister – may prevent it from 
functioning. In the medium term, a divided 
parliament with contested legitimacy will 
most likely be unable to elect a new Leba-
nese president when the term of Michel 
Suleiman expires in May 2014. 
With polarization riding high, compro-
mise on the electoral track remains elusive, 
meaning that any new government may 
rule for an indefinite period of time. The 
stakes involved in government formation 
are therefore high, and the chances of suc-
cess accordingly remote. As long as there is 
no new government, the cabinet of former 
Prime Minister Miqati will stay on in a care-
taker function with limited competences. 
Deadlock between the two camps and diver-
gent interests within them has also pre-
vented the appointment of a new army 
chief and a new chief of staff of the LAF, 
making it necessary to extend the tenures 
of the current officeholders through 
administrative maneuvers of doubtful 
legitimacy as well. 
In their substance, these struggles go 
far beyond the factional bickering and the 
self-serving attitude of which Lebanese 
politicians often stand accused. Rather, 
they relate to the long shadow cast over the 
Lebanese political system by the continuous 
calamity in Syria. Since most Lebanese pol-
itical actors draw much of their bargaining 
power from external support, they remain 
in a state of trepidation as long as the out-
come in Syria and the repercussions on the 
regional power system remain uncertain. 
Compromises, however minimal, are there-
fore difficult to achieve. They will also be 
difficult to sell, as all sides frame the dis-
pute in existential terms – the future, or 
even the survival, of the respective sec-
tarian community – and mobilize by cater-
ing to fear perceptions, for which the war 
in Syria provides ample fuel. The Syrian 
crisis also saps the attention and the capac-
ities of those external actors who have 
forced the Lebanese to compromise in the 
recent past. Thus, very soon, the country 
might be left without any legitimate and 
working political institutions at all. 
From deadlock to violence? 
Already between 2006 and 2008, Lebanon 
experienced a similar process of progres-
sive institutional erosion – with Hizbullah 
and its allies besieging the government in 
Beirut – which led to violence and was only 
ended through an Arab League-sponsored 
settlement on Hizbullah’s terms. Today, no 
such scenario is likely, as the acting govern-
ment is dominated by March 8, which also 
wields sufficient political resources to pre-
vent any new government from being 
formed or acting against its will. Militarily 
speaking, no political force in Lebanon can 
possibly challenge Hizbullah’s militia. As it 
conducts its “resistance activities” (training 
fighters, channeling weapons into Lebanon, 
sending fighters into Syria) with a degree of 
discretion and in areas where it wields un-
challenged control, run-ins with the formal 
authorities, who anyway prefer to look 
the other way, are unlikely. The Lebanese 
authorities have also made little effort to 
track down four leading cadres of Hiz-
bullah indicted for the assassination of the 
late Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, evading 
yet another point of conflict. 
The situation is different concerning 
Sunni extremists. After caving in against 
Hizbullah in 2008, the capacity of March 14 
and the Hariri family to integrate disen-
franchised Sunni youth has receded signifi-
cantly. Instead, radical preachers capitalize 
on resentment stirred up by Hizbullah’s 
domineering role in the Lebanese arena, in 
addition to events in Iraq and Syria. As of 
now, these groups lack the cohesion and 
the means to seriously challenge the LAF, 
let alone Hizbullah. Yet, as the conflict in 
Syria intensifies, this equation is liable to 
change. In mid-2013, areas dominated 
by Sunnis, in particular near the Syrian 
border, are becoming awash with weapons, 
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and with men experienced in their use. As 
the conflict in Syria continues to escalate 
and the rebels receive more and better 
arms, their capacity to impose exclusive 
control over these areas will increase. So 
will their motivation to exact revenge on 
Hizbullah and wrest strategic areas on 
the Lebanese side of the border from the 
control of the party. Additional waves of 
refugees may force the Lebanese authorities 
to finally set up camps, which could then 
become rearguard bases for the fighters. 
The LAF may soon find itself caught in 
a crossfire and will stand accused of becom-
ing a partisan force if it takes on Sunni 
militants while at the same time leaving 
Hizbullah’s armed structures alone. Thanks 
to the post-civil war strategy of replacing 
mono-sectarian army units with mixed 
ones, the force is unlikely to fracture along 
sectarian lines, and so far its esprit de corps 
appears resilient. However, with woefully 
insufficient funding, rising casualties 
among the elite units, a leadership with 
questionable legitimacy and with nearly all 
political institutions paralyzed, it is only a 
matter of time until the LAF lose both the 
capacity and the legitimacy to act on behalf 
of the Lebanese state. Already, operations 
to contain (rather than suppress) armed 
groups in areas identified with certain sec-
tarian groups (Tripoli, eastern parts of the 
Bekaa, the south side of Beirut) require 
clearance with political actors. Once the 
LAF are no longer able to control the flash-
points between the two sides, violent con-
frontations between Sunni militants and 
Hizbullah are all but certain. 
Preventing a downward spiral 
As long as the conflict in Syria continues, 
there is little hope to resolve the paralysis 
of the Lebanese political system. Therefore, 
political and diplomatic efforts by German 
and European actors should focus on help-
ing the Lebanese to prevent a downward 
spiral into major violence. 
Maintaining and improving the capaci-
ties of the LAF is key. Existing British and 
French support, in particular training of 
elite units, should be expanded and up-
graded. Donations of hardware and bud-
getary support for the notoriously under-
funded force should be considered. Equally 
important, the legitimacy of the LAF must 
be retained. European political actors with 
direct access to Lebanese counterparts – 
politicians, parties and party foundations 
in France and Germany – should encourage 
their partners to suspend political differ-
ences and focus on finding a consensual 
solution to the appointment of senior secu-
rity officials, rather than resorting to stop-
gap measures. 
They should also urge these partners to 
distance themselves more clearly from 
radical Sunni groups and to work toward 
curbing their influence among their con-
stituents. While it is understandable that 
the March 14 block focuses its critique on 
Hizbullah’s military apparatus, explaining 
the Jihadist threat solely as a defensive 
reaction is liable to be understood as an 
implicit endorsement in this milieu. On the 
diplomatic level, the close relationship to 
Saudi Arabia entertained by several Euro-
pean states should be used to impress upon 
the Kingdom that an escalation in Lebanon 
will neither serve its own interests nor that 
of the Sunni community there. 
Hizbullah is behaving as a non-demo-
cratic actor on many accounts, and expos-
ing Lebanon to grave danger through its 
involvement in Syria. Yet the party is also 
interested in maintaining the status quo, 
leaving the fight against Sunni radicals to 
the LAF, and avoiding any confrontation 
with Israel for the time being. Progress in 
the P5+1 negotiations with Hizbullah’s 
regional sponsor, Iran, will lower the par-
ty’s threat perception and make it easier to 
avoid escalation in Lebanon. Despite the 
recent listing of Hizbullah’s military wing 
as a terrorist organization, the EU should 
maintain contact with its political struc-
tures, not least for the sake of the safety of 
the European troops active in the United 
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. 
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